Scale economies are commonplace in operations, yet, due to analytical challenges, relatively little is known about how …rms should compete in their presence. This paper presents a model of competition between two …rms that face scale economies; i.e., each …rm's cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand. A general framework is used, which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand (a queuing game) and competition between two retailers with …xed ordering costs and price sensitive consumers (an EOQ game). Reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both …rms participating in the market. We demonstrate, in the context of the queuing game, that the lower cost …rm in equilibrium may have higher market share and a higher price, an enviable situation. We also allow each …rm to outsource their production process to a supplier or to their customers (e.g., co-production). Even if the supplier's technology is no better than the …rms' technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity (so the supplier's scale can be no greater than either …rm's scale), we show that the …rms strictly prefer to outsource. We conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identi…ed in the literature.
Scales economies are commonplace in operations. But while there is a considerable operations management literature that identi…es scale economies and develops strategies to exploit them, relatively little is known about how …rms should compete in their presence. Even the economics literature on competition among …rms generally assumes constant or decreasing returns to scale, so as to avoid the signi…cant analytical complications scale economies create (Vives, 1999) . Nevertheless, research is needed on this challenge. This paper studies competition between two …rms that face scale economies; i.e., cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand. A general framework is employed: it includes, among others, competition between service providers (i.e., a queuing game) and competition between two retailers with …xed ordering costs (i.e., an Economic Order Quantity game).
Firms compete for demand with two instruments: the explicit prices they charge consumers and the operational performance levels they deliver. An example of the latter in the context of the queuing game is the …rm's expected service time, where faster service means better operational performance.
Competition with scale economies is brutal for two reasons. First, a …rm must capture a positive threshold of demand or else it is not pro…table (i.e., small players cannot be profitable). Second, scale economies increase price competition: a price cut increases demand, which lowers the average cost per unit of demand. As a result, an equilibrium may not exist, even with symmetric …rms (i.e., …rms with the same cost and demand). However, when an equilibrium exists in which both …rms have positive demand, then it is unique, under reasonable conditions. Hence, competition in this setting does have some structure. We show that the low cost …rm always has a higher market share in equilibrium, which is not surprising. What is unexpected is that the low cost …rm can also have the higher price, which is certainly an enviable position: the …rm uses its lower cost to dominate with operational performance, which allows the …rm to charge a premium and capture more demand than its rival. As an added bonus, the higher demand also allows the …rm to operate more e¢ciently than its rival. Furthermore, in low margin conditions a small cost advantage can yield an enormous pro…t advantage even if it does not result in a large market share di¤erence.
In this environment, …rms could bene…t from any strategy that mitigates price competitiveness. We show that outsourcing is one such strategy. We suppose that there exists a supplier with the same technology as the …rms. This supplier is able to manage either …rm's operations and charges a constant fee per unit of demand for that service. The supplier establishes dedicated capacity for each …rm that outsources, so the supplier is unable to pool demand across …rms to gain e¢ciency. In other words, the supplier is operationally no more e¢cient than either …rm. Yet, we show that there are contracts that yield the supplier a positive pro…t and yield a higher pro…t to either …rm than if they insourced (i.e., did not outsource with the supplier). Hence, all …rms are better o¤ with outsourcing. In this setting, the …rms do not outsource because the supplier is cheaper (by assumption either …rm is able to generate exactly the same cost as the supplier without paying the supplier's margin). Instead, they outsource because outsourcing dampens price competition. It is also possible that a …rm can bene…t from a unilateral move to outsource, i.e., a …rm may …nd outsourcing pro…table even if its competitor does not outsource. These results do not occur with a constant returns to scale technology. Hence, we conclude that in the presence of scale economies …rms can bene…t from outsourcing even if their supplier is unable to gain any scale advantages.
Outsourcing to another …rm is not the only way to change the nature of the production process. If the …rm is o¤ering a service, then the …rm may be able to outsource some of the production process onto its customers; i.e., the …rms can make its customers co-producers.
Again, we show that …rms may use co-production even if it increases a …rm's cost; i.e., the price discount the …rm must give consumers to compensate for their co-production is greater than the cost the …rm would incur if the …rm did the service itself.
The next section reviews literature relevant to this work. §2 details our model. §3
analyzes equilibrium behavior between two …rms. §4 considers the impact of outsourcing.
The …nal section concludes.
Literature review
The body of research related to this work can be divided into three broad sets. The …rst includes papers that use queuing theory to study the delivery of services. The second set studies competition between …rms that set inventory policies. The third is the literature on outsourcing and vertical integration in operations management, marketing and economics.
As mentioned in the introduction, competing queues is one of the games that falls into our framework. There are many papers that investigate competition when customers are sensitive to time: Armory and Haviv (1998), Chayet and Hopp (1999) , Davidson (1988 ), De Vany (1976 ), De Vany and Saving (1983 , Gans (2000) , Gilbert and Weng (1997) , Kalai, Kamien and Rubinovitch (1992) , Lederer and Li (1997) , Li (1992) , Li and Lee (1994) , and Loch (1994) . In most of these models …rms compete either with prices or with processing rates, but not both.
1 Those authors recognized that allowing for both decisions creates signi…cant analytical complications; in particular, the …rms' pro…t functions are not well behaved (unimodal) . Further, qualitative statements regarding competition in that setting are not possible since pure strategy equilibria do not exist. A second distinction is that in many of those models customers wait in a single queue. 2 In our model, the …rms maintain separate queues and customers are not able to jockey between. Further, with a single queue framework total market demand is constant (i.e., all customers join the queue and are eventually served). We allow for demand functions in which total market demand may decrease. Deneckere and Peck (1995) and Reitman (1991) do consider a model in which …rms simultaneously choose prices and processing rates, and customers choose …rms based on expected utility maximization. However, there are no scale economies in their production processes, which is the main focus of this paper. Gans (2000 Gans ( ,2002 and Hall and Porteus (2000) consider competition between …rms when customer chooses between …rms based on their past service encounters. In our model, 1 Li and Lee (1992) analyze a model with …xed processing rates and then discuss how the model could be expanded to allow the …rms to choose prices as well. However, they emphasize that the lack of pure strategy equilibria in that game imposes a signi…cant challenge to the analysis of the expanded game. In Lederer and Li (1997) , the …rms have …xed overall production capacity, but they decide how to allocate that capacity across multiple customer classes. In the single class version of their model, the …rms only compete on price.
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Gilbert and Weng (1997) do consider a model with separate queues, however the arrival process to each queue is set so that each …rm has the same expected waiting time.
customers correctly anticipate the expected operational performance of each …rm and so demand is not determined by past actions. Chase (1978) and Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1995) recognized that an important design decision for a service …rm is the degree to which the …rm outsources delivery of the service to customers; i.e., the amount of co-production. Ha (1998) considers the interaction between pricing and co-production. In his model a service operation's workload is decreasing in the amount of e¤ort customers exert in preprocessing, which the …rm can in ‡uence via its price schedule. We assume the amount of co-production is …xed and the …rm need only provide a …xed compensation to customers.
Several papers consider pricing and capacity decisions for a single server: Dewan and Mendelson (1990) , Stidham (1992) , Stidham and Rump (1998) , and So and Song (1998) .
(The …rst three papers seek to maximize system value, while the last maximizes a …rm's pro…t.) In fact, the queueing game in this paper is a competitive extension of Stidham's model; when there is a single …rm in the queueing game, that …rm faces the same problem that a monopolist would face in Stidham (1992) . (See Cachon and Harker 1999 for details.) Stidham (1992) and Stidham and Rump (1998) also provide an extensive discussion on the stability of the …rm's pricing and capacity decisions. Given the formulation of our queueing game, equilibrium stability is not an issue.
Many papers investigate queue joining behavior in which customers compete for fast service, but the service provider is not a game participant: Bell and Stidham (1983), Kulkarni (1983) , Lippman and Stidham (1977) , Mendelson (1985) and Naor (1969) . Afèche and Mendelson (2001) extend this work considerably by incorporating generalized delay cost structures (i.e., a customer's delay cost could be proportional to a customer's valuation of the service) and priority auctions.
We now turn to models of inventory competition. Bernstein and Federgruen (1999) study a two echelon supply chain with one supplier and multiple competing retailers. Each retailers demand rate is deterministic, but a function of the …rms' prices. Further, each retailer incurs …xed ordering costs. Hence, our EOQ game is functionally equivalent to their decentralized game (i.e., the game with simple wholesale price contracts.) However, their focus is on channel coordination, which we do not consider, they do not consider outsourcing and they allow for competition among more than two …rms. Bernstein and Federgruen (2001) study price and operational performance competition among multiple …rms that choose base stock policies, where a …rm's operational performance is its …ll rate. However, they work with multiplicative demand shocks, so their model has constant returns to scale.
There are a number of papers that study competing …rms with demand spillovers; i.e., a portion of the unsatis…ed demand at one …rm (due to stockouts) transfers to the other …rm:
Palar (1988), Lippman and McCardle (1995) , Karjalainen (1992) , Anupindi and Bassok (1999) . Our model does not have demand spillovers.
Finally, there is an extensive literature on outsourcing and vertical integration. In operations management the focus is on when outsourcing reduces costs (see McMillan, 1990; Venkatesan, 1992; van Miegham, 1999) . Those papers do not consider the impact of outsourcing on equilibrium prices. In economics the focus is on the location of the …rm boundary;
i.e., what assets does the …rm own. Transaction cost theory suggests this decision hinges on asset speci…city, i.e., if the asset's next best use has signi…cantly lower value, then a …rm will own the asset (e.g., Williamson, 1979) . Grossman and Hart (1986) propose the …rm boundary depends on contract incompleteness: if a …rm cannot specify all possible future uses for an asset in a contract then the …rm will seek ownership if control is su¢ciently important. A third, and more recent approach, suggests that asset ownership in ‡uences relational contracts, which are unwritten agreements between parties that are support only in repeated games (i.e., if one party breaks a relational contract the other party can punish through future actions). (See Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2001 .) Our theory of outsourcing is di¤erent. We explicitly assume away asset speci…city and contract incompleteness, and our single choice model does not allow for future punishment. In our model outsourcing creates value by changing a …rm's competitive behavior. In particular, the …rm becomes less price competitive.
The paper with the most similar …nding to our outsourcing result is from the marketing literature, McGuire and Staelin (1983) . They show that competing suppliers prefer to outsource the retailing function to independent retailers rather than to perform their own retailing when demand is su¢ciently price competitive. Outsourcing bene…ts the suppliers when retail price competition is high because double marginalization between the supplier and the retailer mitigates price competition between the two suppliers. In our setting, outsourcing mitigates price competition for di¤erent reasons. In our model, price competition derives in part from the need to increase demand to reduces costs, which is not present in McGuire and Staelin (1983) because they consider a constant returns to scale production process. Indeed, if there were constant returns to scale in our production process, then outsourcing would provide no bene…t. Further, we consider the outsourcing of the production function and not the retailing function and both …rms are better o¤ with outsourcing for all levels of price competition.
There is also work in economics on divisionalization. Baye, Crocker and Ju (1996) show that in a competitive environment a …rm may divide itself into multiple competing divisions even if divisionalization is costly because divisionalization mitigates price competition. As with divisionalization, outsourcing divides a …rm into multiple pieces (a supplier and the …rm). But there are three key di¤erences between divisionalization and outsourcing. First, with divisionalization the parent …rm sums its pro…ts across divisions whereas with outsourcing there is no aggregation of pro…ts. Second, with divisionalization all divisions compete for consumers whereas with outsourcing the supplier does not compete for customers. (With divisionalization a process is replicated, with outsourcing it is divided.) Third, even though …rms choose to divisionalize, in equilibrium they are worse o¤ after dividing, whereas with outsourcing …rms are better o¤.
Model de…nition
Two …rms, …rm ! and …rm ", compete in a market based on their full prices. Unless otherwise noted, rules, parameters and functions that are de…ned for …rm ! apply analogously for …rm ". Let # ! be …rm !'s full price. It includes two components: 
where
is analogous. As with the demand functions, we often write the pro…t functions without arguments; e.g. ) ! and ) " . In (1) 
cost independent of demand. Given the pro…t functions (1), this game can be analyzed as a game in which each …rm decides on a single action, its full price.
Some additional reasonable restrictions are needed on the demand functions. Demand is never negative, and for any …nite # "¸0 ' there exists a …nite # ! such that ( ! = 0. De…nẽ # ! (# " ) to be the smallest of those full prices; i.e., …rm ! can always price itself out of the market. 4 We assume# ! (# " ) ¡ # " is decreasing in # " ' i.e., …rm !'s price premium to exit the market is decreasing in …rm "'s price. For all
to …rm !'s full price than to …rm "'s full price. Furthermore, ( ! (0' 0) , 0 (i.e., …rm ! can have positive demand for a su¢ciently low price), which implies that#
, demand is su¢ciently large that …rm ! can earn a positive pro…t if …rm " exits the market.
To summarize, the …rms play a simultaneous single move game with full prices as their
3
We do not consider sequential choice games: e.g., …rms choose f% ! ' % " g and then after observing those choices they choose f$ ! ' $ " g, or …rm ! choses f$ ! ' % ! g and then …rm " chooses f$ " ' % " g. Bernstein and Federgruen (2001) consider the former type of sequential choice and Chayet and Hopp (1999) consider the latter.
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While it is possible to relax this assumption, it is cumbersome to also include the
strategies and (1) as their pro…t functions. It remains to identify speci…c models that conform to this structure. Two such model are detailed next.
A queuing game
Suppose each …rm provides a service. Let % ! be the expected amount of time a customer spends at …rm !, including time in queue and time in service. Suppose customer interarrival times at …rm ! are exponentially distributed with mean 10( ! & Customers wait in a single …rst-come-…rst serve queue to receive service at …rm ! and there is no balking. The processing times at …rm ! are exponentially distributed with rate 1 ! . The expected time a customer spends at …rm ! is
assuming 1 ! , ( ! & The steady state distribution of the number of customers at either …rm is the same as the number of units in an 20201 queue.
Let 3 ! be …rm !'s capacity cost rate per unit of capacity,
when it lowers its customers' service time.
Firm !'s pro…t rate is
where recall $ ! = # ! ¡ % ! . For …xed #' the above is strictly concave in % ! and the optimal operational performance,
which conforms to (1) when
An EOQ inventory game
Suppose each …rm sells a product. Demand is deterministic with rate ( ! & The …rm pays a wholesale price 4 ! per unit purchased, incurs a …xed cost 3 ! for each replenishment, which arrives immediately, and incurs 5 ! per unit of inventory per unit of time. Neither …rm backorders demand, so from a customer's perspective the …rms have identical operational performance: let % ! = % " = 0& In this game there is an industry standard regarding operational performance (i.e., no backorders) so competition between the …rms occurs only with their explicit prices. Nevertheless, a …rm's pro…t depends on the cost of delivering that performance, which depends on demand.
where # ! = $ ! ' and 6 ! is the …rm's order quantity, i.e., its operational decision. The latter part of the …rm's cost corresponds to the cost function of the well known economic order quantity (EOQ) problem. The cost minimizing order quantity is 6
…rm's expected pro…t rate is then
3 Analysis of equilibrium A Nash equilibrium in this game is a pair of full prices, f#
" g' such that neither …rm has a pro…table unilateral deviation. In this game analysis of equilibrium is complex because the …rms' pro…t functions are not unimodal. Hence, standard theorems for demonstrating existence and uniqueness cannot be applied. Nevertheless, we present conditions under which each …rm's pro…t function has a single interior local maximum. That provides enough structure to obtain some results on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.
De…ne …rm !'s reaction correspondence
as the smallest solution to …rm !'s …rst-order condition:
if there is no solution to the …rst-order condition. Due to scale economies, there may exist multiple solutions to the …rst-order condition or there may be no solution.
The problem is that ) ! is negative and convex if # ! is too close to# ! (# " ); i.e., if demand is too low. However, according to the next theorem, under reasonable conditions 7 ! (# " ) contains only one element if there exists some full price that generates positive pro…ts for …rm !. The condition in the following theorem is assumed throughout.
is decreasing and strictly convex in
Proof. Di¤erentiate and rearrange terms:
is the smallest # ! that satis…es the …rst order condition. It is the unique interior optimal (4)
¡1 is decreasing. Thus, the right hand side of (4) is
The following demand functions satisfy the above requirement: linear demand,
with 8 ! , 0' 9 ! , 0 and 9 ! , : ! , 0; and truncated logit demand,
with 8 ! , 0, 9 . 0 and ; , 2= , 0. 5 Note that ( ! may be convex in # ! ' but not too convex.
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The next theorem further characterizes each …rm's optimal response. In particular, it demonstrates that there is a single discontinuity in
Due to the discontinuity in 7 ! (# " )' existence of a Nash equilibrium is not assured. 7 Al-
5
The 9 constant must be the same for …rm ! and …rm " due to the ¡/(
Convex 10( ! (#) is the most general condition for quasi-concave payo¤ functions when -¸1 (i.e., costs are convex and increasing in demand), which is equivalent to the condition that the slope of ¡(
is less than 1. Thus, the condition in Theorem 1 is more restrictive. However, it is not a necessary condition.
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Discountinuities in the reaction correspondence do not automatically rule out the ex-ternatively, there may be multiple equilibria. However, it is possible to provide conditions under which there is at most one Nash equilibrium in which both …rms have positive demand.
(In other words, if there are multiple equilibria under those conditions, then in all but one of them at least one of the …rm exits the market.) We refer to any equilibrium in which both …rms have positive demand as a full-participation equilibrium.
Theorem 3 De…ne
holds for all f#
, then there exists at most one fullparticipation equilibrium; i.e., an equilibrium in which both …rms have positive demand.
Proof. The …rst step is to show if j7 0 ! (# " )j . 1 for all # "¸º # " and the same for …rm ", then there is at most one equilibrium with positive demand for both …rms. (This is less restrictive than showing that the best-reply mapping is a contraction, which it is not.) The second step shows (5) implies those conditions. For the …rst step proof is by contradiction. Suppose there are two equilibria, f#
e., the reaction functions are continuous between the two equilibria. j7
Using the …rst-order condition, the above derivatives can be written as
istence of Nash equilibrium. For example there exists a Nash equilibrium if 7 ! (# ! ) is everywhere decreasing (see Vives 1999) . But that condition does not hold in this game.
The theory of supermodular games (see Topkis, 1998) applies even if there are discontinuities, but this game is neither supermodular nor log-supermodular.
Note that substitution of the …rst-order condition into the positive-pro…t condition,
Hence, combining (6) with (7) 
in Theorem 3 can be written in a simpler, albeit more restrictive form:
The above While Theorems 3 provides conditions under which there is at most one equilibrium with both …rms participating in the market, it does not guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
In fact, as is shown by example later, a Nash equilibrium may not even exist in a symmetric game (a game in which the …rms' parameters are identical). Nevertheless, the next theorem provides a condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4 In a symmetric game, i.e.,
for any # 1 and # 2 , there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and both …rms have positive demand in equilibrium if the conditions in Theorem 3 hold and
0 for all # ! and # " is often presented as a uniqueness condition in economics (see Vives, 1999) . That condition is even more restrictive than (8) Proof. From Theorem 3 7 ! (# " ) . 1& Hence, there exists a full-participation equilibrium, 
. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with # " . º # " .¤
To explore the condition in Theorem 4 further, de…ne
i.e., º ( ! is …rm !'s positive demand when …rm !'s optimal pro…t is zero. In a symmetric game with linear demand
The above is more likely to hold as 8, : or -increase and as 9' + or * decrease, i.e., the existence of equilibrium becomes more likely as base demand increases, scale e¤ects decrease (+ decreases or -increases), as cost decreases and as the market becomes less price sensitive (9 ¡ : decreases).
To illustrate the possible equilibrium con…gurations, consider the queueing game with logit demand: 8 = ¡9 = ; = 1; = = ? = 1E-5& Figure 1 displays each …rm's reaction function in a symmetric game with low capacity cost, * ! = * " = 0&1& In this situation each …rm always participates in the market and there is a unique equilibrium. Figure 2 shows that either …rm may choose to not participate in the market if costs are higher, * ! = * " = 0&4'
and the other …rm chooses a low full price. Yet, there still is a unique equilibrium and both …rms participate in the market. If costs are increased substantially, * ! = * " = 3&75' there may not exist an equilibrium, as is shown in Figure 3 , even in a symmetric game. If costs are further increased, * ! = * " = 4&75' then two equilibria emerge, as shown in Figure 4 .
With either equilibrium only one …rm participates in the market. Figure 5 demonstrates that with asymmetric costs, * ! = 4&75 and * " = 0&4' there may exist a single equilibrium in which only one …rm participates in the market (in this case it is …rm ")& In fact, there is a continuum of equilibria in this case, where any f#
From a predictive point of view it is heartening that there exists at most one fullparticipation equilibrium. But if there is no equilibrium then, by de…nition the game is not stable, and we are unable to say much more with this model.
To move away from the issue of existence, consider the characteristics of a full-participation equilibrium. The …rst result is expected.
Theorem 5 
it follows that /7 ! (# " )0/* ! , 0& The analogous process demonstrates the needed result for the + ! parameter.¤ From Theorem 5 it follows that if the game is symmetric with respect to parameters and demand with the exception that one …rm has a lower cost than the other, then the low cost …rm has a higher market share. But Theorem 5 makes no claim regarding the …rms' explicit prices. In fact, it is quite possible that the low cost …rm has a higher market share and a higher explicit price; a highly enviable position from a manager's perspective. 10 To illustrate, suppose * ! = 0&1' * " = 0&4 and all other parameters are as de…ned in Figures 1 and   2 . In that case #
Firm ! can have a higher price and a higher market share because …rm ! serves its customers more quickly, thereby allowing it to charge a premium.
equilibrium.
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In the inventory game, a …rm's full price equals its explicit price, so in that case the theorem states the low cost …rm has the lower explicit price as well.
To explore further when the low cost …rm has a higher explicit price we study a particular game that is amenable to analysis. Consider the queuing game with the following symmetric linear demand
in addition the …rms have symmetric costs, * ! = * " = *' then there exists a unique fullparticipation equilibrium, f#
where @ is de…ned as @ = 9* 1$2 8 3$2 and @ 2 (0' 1) to ensure positive pro…ts. Now suppose …rm "'s cost is increased slightly. The next theorem provides the conditions for which $ ! , $ " in the new equilibrium (assuming it exists). In other words, when (13) holds a slight increase in …rm "'s cost increases …rm !'s price in equilibrium more than …rm "'s price.
Theorem 6 If a full-participation equilibrium exists in the symmetric queuing game, i.e., * ! = * " = * and demand is given by (9) then
where the arguments for # ¤ ! (* ! ' * " ) and $ ¤ ! (* ! ' * " ) have been dropped for notational clarity. From the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule
where, jAj ' jA % ! j and¯A % "¯a re evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium and
Given that @ . 1 (12) can be simpli…ed to (13).¤ Given @ . 1' (13) fails to hold only if
Hence, in markets with low demand, 8 . 1' (13) always holds (because * . 8). In markets with greater demand, (13) is more likely as the market becomes more price sensitive, i.e, as 9 increases. Table 1 provides some data on the impact of a cost advantage. In those scenarios …rm "'s cost is either 1%, 5% or 10% lower than …rm !'s cost (* " 0* ! = 0.99, 0.95 and 0.90 respectively).
This cost advantage gives …rm " a modest market share advantage (( ¤ " 0(28)). Firm " may have lower equilibrium price than …rm ! when demand is not price sensitive (9 = 0&2)' and always has a higher equilibrium price when demand is price sensitive (9 = 0&75)& However, the price di¤erence between the …rms across all scenarios is small ($
¤ " ' where recall a higher ratio means worse performance for …rm !). In these scenarios, rather than beating its competitor on price, …rm " exploits its cost advantage to o¤er customers better operational performance. The result is a substantial pro…t bonus for …rm "&
Outsource to a supplier
This section explores the motivation for outsourcing. Suppose now there exists a third …rm, called the supplier. The supplier does not (or cannot) sell directly to consumers, but the supplier has the ability to perform the …rms' operations. (van Mieghem 1999 takes the same approach to subcontracting). For example, the operation in question may be a call center, which could be owned and managed by a …rm, or, the …rm could outsource that function to the supplier.
We model outsourcing with a two stage game. In the …rst stage, called the negotiation stage, both …rms attempt to negotiate an outsourcing contract with the supplier. The contract has two parameters, 4 , and % , : 4 , is the amount the supplier charges the …rm per customer the supplier serves for the …rm, and % , is the operational performance the supplier guarantees. For example, in a call center context the contract could specify a fee for each call processed (4 , ) and a guaranteed average waiting time (% , ). We assume that it is easy to monitor the supplier's operational performance and so ensuring compliance with contractual terms is not an issue. In addition, we rule out any renegotiate of contractual terms after they are set. For notational convenience, we will often de…ne the contract in terms of * , and % , , where * , = % , + 4 , & We do not explicitly model this negotiation process (e.g., which …rm makes the …rst o¤er or the process by which the …rms converge to a signed contract).
Instead, we will focus on identifying the set of contracts that leave both parties at least as well o¤ as they would be if no contract were signed. 
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Much of the supply chain contracting literature assumes one of the …rms makes a takeit-or-leave-it o¤er to the other …rm, thereby implicitly assigning all bargaining power to the o¤ering …rm. We could adopt that approach, but then the outcome of the analysis In the second stage, called the competitive stage, the …rms compete for customers as in §2. For analytical tractability we assume in the second stage the …rms play the queuing game, * ! = * " = *' and demand has the linear form given by (9),
The negotiations in the …rst stage do not necessarily lead to signed outsourcing agreements. The supplier, being a rational player, will sign a contract only if she expects to earn a non-negative pro…t. The …rms, also acting rationally, will sign contracts only if they expect to earn at least as much with the contract as they would without an outsourcing agreement, i.e., each …rm has the option to "insource" and compete in the second stage with complete control of his operations. To be speci…c, if negotiations in the …rst stage fail to reach an agreement (i.e., the …rm insources), then the …rm, as in §2, has two decisions in the second stage, his explicit price and his operational performance, and incurs a cost * per unit of capacity installed. But if a …rm has a signed outsourcing agreement with the supplier, then in the second stage the …rm only chooses its explicit price, since his operational performance is speci…ed by the outsourcing agreement, and incurs a 4 , cost per unit of demand.
One would expect to observe outsourcing agreements if the supplier is able to o¤er the …rms a good deal because the supplier has lower costs than the …rms: e.g., the supplier has better technology, lower labor costs (e.g., due to the absence of unions) or greater scale. The latter is possible if the supplier is able to combine the demands of multiple …rms. While the "low cost" explanation for outsourcing is plausible, it does not appear to be suitable for all cases. For example, there are cases observed in practice in which outsourcing occurs between a …rm and a supplier that establishes a dedicated facility for the …rm (e.g., a factory that produces output only for the …rm or a call center that process calls only from the …rm's customers) and the supplier's technology is arguably no better than her clients' technology. Thus, we seek an alternative explanation for outsourcing. To control for the low cost hypothesis, we assume the supplier does not have better technology or lower costs, i.e., all outsourcing agreements involve dedicated operations (the supplier cannot pool demand would be a single contract, the one that leaves the receiving …rm indi¤erent between accepting it or not and assigns all incremental gains from the contract to the o¤ering …rm. It is unlikely that outsourcing contracts are managed in that way in practice. across both …rms) and the supplier's cost is identical to either …rm's. To be speci…c, for any operational performance level and demand rate, the supplier's cost with an outsourcing agreement is identical to what the …rm's cost would be if the …rm choose instead to insource:
i.e., the supplier incurs a cost * per unit of capacity that must be installed to generate the promised operational performance given the anticipated demand rate.
Since the supplier is unable to o¤er lower costs to the …rms, it is not at all clear that there even exists an outsourcing contract that the parties can agree to in the …rst stage. If for any operational performance level and demand rate the …rm can achieve the same cost as the supplier without having to pay the supplier's margin, then why would a …rm agree to any contract that gives the supplier a positive margin? But there is a ‡aw in that argument: it does not account for how the equilibrium in the competitive stage depends on the outcome of the negotiation stage. In other words, a …rm that has an outsourcing agreement behaves di¤erently in the competitive stage than one that does not, and this di¤erence is signi…cant.
Both …rms outsource
In this section we …rst demonstrate the …rms prefer that they both outsource rather than they both insource. But just as the two players in a Prisoners' Dilemma game prefer that they both cooperate over they both defect, this does not mean the outcome will be both …rms outsourcing. Several conditions are necessary for that to happen: a …rm must prefer to outsource if the other …rm outsources (which does not happen in the Prisoners' Dilemma, defect is optimal if the other cooperates) ; a …rm must prefer to outsource if the other …rm insources (which also does not happen in the Prisoners' Dilemma, defect is optimal if the other defects); and the supplier must earn a non-negative pro…t with both contracts.
Lets begin with the scenario that both …rms insource (i.e., they both fail or refuse to negotiate a deal with the supplier in stage one). This scenario is evaluated in section 3: the equilibrium full price is (10), and the equilibrium pro…t is (11), repeated here for convenience,
where @ = 9* 1$2 8 ¡3$2 and @ 2 (0' 1) ensures positive pro…ts.
The next scenario to consider in stage two has both …rms outsourcing. In this case each …rm in the competition stage faces linear demand and a constant marginal cost. This is the classical di¤erentiated Bertrand competition game with constant marginal cost. It is well studied in economics (Vives, 1999) and it is known to have a unique closed form equilibrium.
For simplicity, assume the outsourcing agreement, f4 , ' % , g' is the same for the two …rms, which has several justi…cations: the …rms are a priori identical, so it is not clear why one of them would be able to negotiate a better deal; antitrust regulations generally require suppliers to treat their customers equally unless it can be shown that there are di¤erences in costs to serve customers (which do not exist in this case by assumption); and it is less likely that both …rms outsource if one …rm's contract is less favorable than the other …rm's (because that …rm is then more likely to prefer insourcing). In the competition stage …rm
where recall * , = 4 , + % , and $ ! = # ! ¡ % , . The equilibrium full price is # ¤ ! = (809) + * , + % , and each …rm's pro…t is
A quick comparison of (15) with (14) reveals that each …rm's pro…t is higher when the …rms both outsource than when they both insource. Remarkably, the result is independent of the outsourcing terms. The reason follows from two observations: (1) when both …rms outsource they set their price, (809 + * , )' equal to a …xed markup over * , , and (2) neither …rm's demand decreases in its full price as long as the …rms choose the same full price (i.e., there is a constant market size and prices only function to allocate that market between the …rms). Hence, the sum of the …rms' costs is independent of the full prices as long as the …rms choose the same full price.
Now that we have established that both …rms prefer the competitive stage with both …rms outsourcing rather than both insourcing, we need to con…rm they will indeed make that choice and the supplier can earn a non-negative pro…t. Let's begin with the supplier.
The supplier's pro…t from her contract with …rm ! is
where ( ! is …rm !'s demand rate in the stage two equilibrium, *(( ! + % ¡1 , ) is the supplier's capacity cost rate and recall 4 , = * , ¡ % , . To know whether a non-negative expected pro…t will be earned with this contract, the supplier must anticipate what ( ! will be. Clearly it depends on …rm !'s pro…t function if …rm ! signs the outsourcing contract:
where note # ! ¡* , = $ ! ¡ 4 , & The above tells us that the equilibrium # ! , which will determine ( ! , depends only on * , and not on how * , is divided between 4 , and % , & As a result, if * , is …xed, then ( ! is …xed (i.e., independent of % , ), ) , (* , ' % , ) is strictly concave in % , ' the supplier's optimal operational performance is
and the supplier's pro…t is
The supplier can then accept any outsourcing contract as long as ) , (* , )¸0& From (16) and (17), the set of such contracts, parameterized by ?' is f* , ' % , :
where ( ! is what the supplier anticipates the competitive stage demand rate for the …rm will be. (Note that * , , % , ' which ensures a non-negative 4 , &)
Recall that our main objective is to determine if there exists a set of outsourcing contracts that all three …rms can agree to sign. Suppose the supplier anticipates that the …rm signing the contract will have a competitive stage equilibrium demand rate ( ! = 8& In that case, from (18), the set of acceptable contracts is f* , ' % , :
We next explore whether (19) is acceptable to the …rms. To do so we must explore what would happen if only one …rm made an outsourcing agreement.
Suppose …rm ! does not accept an outsourcing contract, but …rm " does. The …rms' pro…t functions are then Theorem 7 Suppose …rm ! insources but …rm " signs an outsourcing contract from (19) with 1 · ? .
where recall @ = 9* 1$2 8 ¡3$2 and @ 2 (0' 1). In the competition stage there exists a unique equilibrium; …rm !'s demand is (
¤ , where ; ¤ is the largest solution to B(;' ?) = 1; 2 , ; ¤ , 1; …rm !'s demand is greater than …rm "'s demand; …rm "'s pro…t is (8 2 09)(2¡; ¤ ) 2 ; …rm !'s pro…t is (8 2 09)C(; ¤ ); and …rm's pro…t is greater than …rm "'s pro…t.
Proof. Both …rms exiting the market cannot be an equilibrium because total demand is constant at 28& Now rule out that …rm " exits the market; i.e., chooses
Substitute …rm !'s …rst-order condition into the above and simplify yields ? .
Similarly, it can be shown that if …rm " anticipates …rm ! exits the market, then there exists an # ! such that …rm ! earns positive pro…t; i.e., …rm ! exiting the market is also not an equilibrium. We now show there exists a unique interior equilibrium.
Any interior equilibrium, f# ' so we express the equilibrium implicitly in terms of ;' which is a proxy for …rm !'s market share.
If ( ! is the equilibrium demand rate, then from the two equations above we have
where recall, (20) and (21). Thus, substitute (20) and (21) into (
) and simplify:
Given that * , ¡ * = 2?* 1$2 8 ¡1$2 ' the above can be written as
For the remainder of this proof ;¸0 is implied. B(;' ?) is convex; let ¹ ; minimize B(;' ?)'
and B((@04) 2$3 ' ?) . 1' so the smaller solution to (22) is a local minimum for …rm ! and the larger solution is a local maximum. Let ; ¤ be that larger solution to B(;' ?) = 1& It is easy to con…rm that ; ¤ , 1 when ?¸1. ; ¤ is the unique interior equilibrium if both …rms earn positive pro…t. Substitute …rm !'s …rst-order condition into the pro…t function to yield …rm !'s equilibrium pro…t in terms of equilibrium demand:
Since C(;) , 0 for ; , 1 it follows that …rm ! indeed earns a positive pro…t at ; ¤ & A similar approach yields …rm "'s pro…t. The boundary condition on ? ensures that ; ¤ . 2'
hence …rm " also earns a positive pro…t. Firm "'s demand is (
Firm !'s pro…t is increasing in ? and …rm "'s is decreasing in ?' so it is su¢cient to compare pro…ts for ? = 1& Use B(; ¤ ' 1) = 1 to solve for @ and substitute into the pro…t condition.
That yields 8 , 3
According to Theorem 7, in the insource-outsource scenarion (one …rm insources, the other outsources) then the insource …rm has a higher market share and a higher pro…t.
Nevertheless, according to the next theorem, there exists a subset of (19) with which both …rms prefer to outsource whether the other …rm outsources or not. Furthermore, twith that subset of contracts the supplier earns a non-negative pro…t because the supplier's anticipated demand rate with each contract (8) indeed materializes in equilibrium.
Theorem 8 De…ne?
where; is the unique solution to C(;) = 1 and @ 2 (0' 1)& 
into the condition C(; ¤ ) . 1 and simplify: 
The above can be con…rmed numerically for; 2 (1' 2). Hence, both …rms prefer to outsource no matter whether the other …rm outsources or not.¤
The …rms bene…t from outsourcing even though outsourcing provides no operational advantage because outsourcing mitigates price competition. In either the competitive stage equilibrium with both …rms outsourcing or the competitive stage equilibrium with both …rms insourcing each …rm's demand equals 8' and so their costs are identical in either game. But in the former their equilibrium price is * + (809) + 2(*08) 1$2 whereas in the latter their equilibrium price is * + (809)& Prices rise with outsourcing because with outsourcing the …rms face constant returns to scale; i.e., their costs per customer are 4 , no matter how many customers they have. Outsourcing eliminates the need to cut prices to increase demand to lower costs; i.e., it eliminates the additional price competition due to scale economies.
To emphasize the importance of scale economies, consider the same game except with constant returns to scale; i.e., …rm !'s pro…t function is
if it insources and
if it outsources, where 4 , is the wholesale price the supplier charges and demand is the
2 ) 2 and if they both insource their pro…t is ¦ Table 2 presents some numerical analysis for each of the three scenarios in the competitive stage. As costs increase or as the market becomes more competitive (9 increases), i.e., the @ parameter increases, the incremental gain to the …rms from outsourcing increases. Even if the …rms negotiate the most attractive contract for them, ? = 1' a …rm does not bene…t from insourcing if the other …rm outsources, even though the insourcing …rm can gain a signi…cant market share advantage (( -028). In the insource-outsource scenario it is the outsourcing …rm that fairs the worse, but that …rm still fairs better than if it were to insource as well. even a monopoly supplier's pro…t potential is limited by the …rms' threat to insource. . = a …rm's equilibrium pro…t in the outsource-outsource scenario )
-. = the insource …rm's equilibrium pro…t in the insource-outsource scenario )
.-= the outsource …rm's equilibrium pro…t in the insource-outsource scenario
One …rm outsources
Theorem 8 establishes that there is a set of outsourcing contracts that all …rms are willing to sign. While those contracts earn the supplier a non-negative pro…t on each contract, it is essential that the competitive stage equilibrium demand rate with each contract be no less than 8& Any lower demand rate could generate a negative pro…t for the supplier, and surely would do so if ? = 1& That could occur if one …rm insources: in the insource-outsource competitive stage equilibrium the insourcing …rm prices aggressively to build scale, thereby leaving the outsourcing …rm with less than 8 demand, as shown in Theorem 7. Thus, even though in our model it is not in the interest of a …rm to insource (i.e., there exists outsourcing contract that make the …rm better o¤), it is useful to explore what would happen if, for reasons that we do not model, one …rm surely insources. This imposes an even higher challenge to the viability of outsourcing: the supplier needs better terms to break even because the supplier correctly anticipates that the outsourcing …rm's demand rate will be less than 8 due to the price aggressiveness of the insourcing …rm. Hence, we now consider the outsourcing game described in the previous section with one modi…cation:
in the negotiation stage only the supplier and …rm " negotiate an outsourcing contract and both …rms know for sure that …rm ! will insource.
According to the next theorem, even though the supplier is forced to operate at a lower scale than the insourcing …rm and outsourcing provides no operational advantage, there may exist contracts that are acceptable to both the supplier and …rm ". In other words, outsourcing may be a pro…table unilateral strategy even though the outsourcing …rm's scale
is lower than what it would have if it insourced.
Theorem 9 De…neB
] that satis…esB(;) = 1& Furthermore, if …rm ! insources and …rm " outsources with contract * , = * + 2(*0(
2 (2 ¡;) 2 09' …rm " prefers to outsource than insource and the supplier earns zero pro…t with that outsourcing contract.
Proof. From (18), the supplier's break even contract with ? = 1 and; = ( ¤ ! 08 is
As in Theorem 7, the …rst order conditions and the above contract lead to the following implicit equation for the equilibrium in terms of …rm !'s demand rate relative to 8 :
The above can have up to three solutions. The solution with ; . 1 leads to a local minimum for …rm !, so it is ruled out. If @ = 0' then; = 1 = 2 ¡ (1 ¡ @) 1$2 andB(;) = 1&
there is a uniqueB(;) = 1 in that interval. Finally, …rm " earns more by accepting the outsourcing contract than by insourcing if 8 2 (2 ¡;) 2 09 , 8 2 (1 ¡ @)09' which simpli…es to
While the theorem assumes the supplier breaks even with the outsourcing contract (? = 1), if @ . 304 then there exists some ? , 1 that achieves the same outcome and yields the supplier a positive pro…t. For brevity, the analysis of the upper bound on ? is omitted.
Discussion
Taken together, Theorems 8 and 9 suggest that outsourcing is a very attractive strategy in the presence of scale economies. Outsourcing mitigates downstream price competition which generates incremental rents that can be captured by all of the …rms, i.e., there exists a set of contracts that result in non-negative pro…ts for all …rms. The particular contract that will be chosen depends the relative bargaining power of the …rms, which could depend on a number of factors that we do not model (e.g., the number of suppliers that can provide outsourcing services, which …rm makes the …rst o¤er, how long the negotiations last, etc.).
Nevertheless, we feel that the key contribution of this research is to demonstrate that viable outsourcing contracts exist even if outsourcing provides no cost advantage.
It is worthwhile to discuss a number of extensions to this model. To begin, we assumed that the …rms's default pro…t level is zero, e.g., the supplier is willing to accept any contract that yields a non-negative pro…t. It is not di¢cult conceptually to extend the results to consider a positive pro…t threshold (e.g., to re ‡ect the supplier's outside opportunities if the …rms fail to negotiate acceptable terms or to re ‡ect additional coordination costs that could occur with outsourcing), but that change is cumbersome analytically and would clearly reduce the set of feasible outsourcing contracts without changing our main qualitative insight.
While we have only a single supplier, our results extend to multiple suppliers. Because the supplier establishes dedicated capacity for each customer, each contract is evaluated on its own. Hence, there is no di¤erence between one supplier signing a f* , ' % , g contract with two …rms and two di¤erent suppliers each signing a f* , ' % , g with a single …rm. The presence of multiple suppliers could in ‡uence which contract is signed in the feasible set (i.e., more suppliers probably means contracts that are more favorable to the …rms), but it does not in ‡uence the set of feasible contracts. In addition, it is not necessary that the …rms sign the same outsourcing contract. The …rm that is lucky enough to get better terms would have an advantage in the competitive stage, which makes insourcing more attractive to the other …rm. But because outsourcing is strictly preferred for a wide range of parameters, it is still possible that one …rm prefers to outsource even if his terms are not as good as his competitor's terms.
More restrictive is our assumption that demand has a particular linear form. We do so because that demand results in closed form solutions for two of the three scenarios in the competitive stage. We suspect that out results carry over to other demand models, but this is di¢cult to con…rm analytically. (We have con…rmed this for logit demand numerically.)
But we do admit that the is a special feature in our demand model that makes outsourcing particularly attractive: total demand is independent of the …rms' full prices as long as the full prices are identical. As a result of this feature, increasing industry prices does not reduce industry demand and therefore does not reduce the industry's scale. With other demand models the mitigation of price competition could lead to lower industry demand and therefore higher industry costs. That works against outsourcing, but outsourcing is still viable if demand does not decline too much, which would be typical of price competitive industries where price functions primarily to allocate share.
While we have emphasized throughout our analysis that the supplier does not have lower costs and cannot build additional scale by pooling the …rms' demands, it should also be noted that the "low cost" explanation for outsourcing is not refuted by our price mitigation explanation, nor is the price mitigation explanation refuted by the low cost explanation. In other words, if the supplier were able to have lower costs by pooling demand across the two …rms then both motivations for outsourcing would be in place, thereby making outsourcing even more attractive.
Finally, although we have concentrated on outsourcing to another …rm, in a service context it may even be possible to outsource in part to customers; i.e., co-production. For example, in the …nancial service industry it is increasingly more common for customers to enter trade orders rather than brokers (Schonfeld, 1998) . A key issue with co-production is how it can transform a process with scale economies to one with constant returns to scale. In the extreme co-production allows each customer to be their own server, hence, congestion e¤ects are eliminated and the process exhibits constant returns to scale. However, in most cases a …rm must compensate its customers for their additional work in the form of a lower explicit price. 12 If customers are ine¢cient at their tasks, then the needed price discount may be unacceptable to the …rm.
As in the previous models, let $ ! be …rm !'s explicit price. Let % + be a co-producing customer's time and e¤ort costs and let 4 + be the …rm's additional costs per customer. As before, # ! = $ ! + % + is …rm !'s full price. Assuming co-production is a constant return to scale technology, if …rm ! uses co-production then its pro…t function is
where * + = % + + 4 + . Thus, whether a …rm chooses to outsource to its customers or to a supplier is functionally equivalent: with the supplier the …rm faces a constant cost per unit of demand equal to * , whereas with co-production the …rm faces a constant cost per unit of demand equal to * + . As a result, the analysis from section 4 continues to hold: even if a …rm's cost with co-production is greater than with insourcing each …rm prefers that both …rms use co-production, and if co-production's cost is not too excessive both …rms outsource even though they could choose to insource. There are only two small distinctions between outsourcing to a supplier and co-production. First, with supplier outsourcing the …rms negotiate the terms of trade whereas with co-production * + is set exogenously: coproduction may not be feasible if * + happens to be too large. Second, a unilateral move to co-production is actually more likely than a unilateral move to supplier outsourcing: if only one …rm outsources then the supplier must charge a premium to re ‡ect the lower amount of demand served, but the cost per unit of demand is independent of demand with co-production.
It is beyond the scope of this research to delve deeper into the issue of co-production, but we do mention two promising directions for future research. First, a customer's coproduction cost, * + ' could depend on a number of factors under a …rm's control: e.g., the …rm's design e¤ort, and the number of tasks consumers perform. Second, co-production could still exhibit scale economies, just less so than if the …rm insources.
12
Co-production is a rich issue, of which we brie ‡y discuss only one facet. See Moon and Frei (2000) for additional discussion.
Conclusion
The prevalence of outsourcing has surely grown in most industries. For example, …ve large contract manufacturers increased their revenues from $1.7 billion in 1992 to $53.6 billion in 2001. 13 . PC manufacturers have begun to outsource their …nal assembly to their distributors (Hansell, 1998) . Retailers and hospitals have outsourced the inventory function to their suppliers (Cachon and Fisher, 1997; Bonneau et al., 1995) . Banks have begun to outsource many of their back-o¢ce operations (Dalton, 1998) . There may be many reasons for this trend, and so we surely do not claim our results provide the single answer for why outsourcing has grown in all industries. Nor do our results contradict previous theories to explain the insource/outsource decision: e.g., asset speci…city (Williamson 1979) , incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986) , relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2001) or capacity pooling (van Mieghem 1999).
Our theory of outsourcing is novel in that we highlight how outsourcing changes the nature of downstream competition. In particular, we …nd that scale economies make price competition brutal, and so …rms naturally can bene…t from strategies to mitigate price competition. We show that outsourcing is one such strategy. Much to our surprise and keen interest, we also …nd a …rm can bene…t from a unilateral move to mitigate price competition even if that move puts the …rm at a cost disadvantage. Hence, it is not required for an industry to simultaneously transition from complete insourcing to complete outsourcing. An industry may transition one …rm at a time, and once the industry's structure has transitioned to outsourcing, …rms do not have an incentive to revert back to insourcing. Furthermore, …rms need not outsource to other …rms. Some …rms, in particular if they provide a service, may be able to outsource some of the production to their customers.
In a broader sense, this works provides a bridge between two large literatures; it combines fundamental models from the operations management literature (the 20201 model from queuing and the EOQ model from inventory) with a cornerstone model from oligopolistic competition in economics (di¤erentiated Bertrand competition). Clearly there are numerous extensions worth pursuing. We await many interesting managerial insights from this melding
13
Annual report data from Solectron, Flextronics, Celestica, SCI Systems and Jabil Circuit.
of operational detail with competitive dynamics. 
